INTRODUCTION
In the wake of one of the largest financial crises in history, pensions became an issue foremost in people's minds. The focus on pensions is not, however, prompted by the positive state of the pension market.
Rather to the contrary, the way in which the Netherlands and many other European Union (EU) Member States and countries have structured their pension systems is now under severe pressure. This is obviously due first of all to an omnipresent problem: ageing. The number of pension beneficiaries is seeing higher proportionate increases than the economically active population that is needed to fund the pension benefits.
1 Second, there are all manner of more specific, Member State-related factors to consider. In the Netherlands, the unique system in its current form comes with a set of problems. 2 However, also other countries that operate more traditional pension schemes find themselves faced with changes no matter what (see below).
The challenge that confronts EU Member States warrants a revision of the pension system -in some cases fundamentally so. In addition, where tax aspects are concerned, the Court has ruled repeatedly that place of the registered office of a pension institution shall not affect the tax deductibility of pension contributions. 6 The last example we will mention is -not unimportantly -the introduction of the Pension Directive in 2003. 7 This Directive represented the first step towards a Europe-wide organized market for occupation retirement provisions. At present, in 2010, we can establish, however, that this internal market has hardly come off the ground until now.
We will address this issue in more detail below.
The European Commission now considers addressing the pension issue as a priority. In 2010, it published a Green Paper entitled 'towards adequate, sustainable and safe European pension systems' ('the Green Paper'). 8 The Commission had already pronounced the future of pensions a key priority in the legislative programme for 2010. 9 The Green Paper identifies a number of challenges that lie ahead of the EU Member States over the next few years. In addition to the aforementioned ageing (and the problems directly related to it), 10 these would include changes to pension systems, 11 the impact of the financial and economic crisis, 12 and removing obstacles to mobility in the EU. The
Commission takes a cautious approach. It states explicitly that Member States are responsible for pension provision and that the Green
Paper does not question Member States' prerogatives in pensions or the role of social partners. 13 The Commission has initiated a public debate to consult with all stakeholders about the identified challenges.
14 In this article, we will focus on a number of impediments that stand in the way of an internal market for occupational retirement provision. Pension funds are an integral part of financial markets and their design can promote or inhibit the free movement of labour or capital. 15 A well-functioning internal market does not have any unjustified national obstacles that inhibit the free movement of pension institutions guaranteeing the level playing field between EU Member States, on the one hand, and financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, and pension funds), on the other. In our article, we will address the obstacles that we feel, based on our experience, play a key role in keeping the internal market from developing, 16 that is:
-lack of clarity on the concept of 'cross-border activity' (section 3.1);
-differences in substantive and institutional European and national supervisions (section 3.2);
-tax impediments for cross-border pension institutions, pension schemes, and workers (section 3.3).
For a proper understanding of the issue, we have provided some background information below.
BACKGROUND
In 2003, the European legislature issued a directive on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provi- the investment risk. In a DB scheme, the sponsor (usually the employer) bears the risk; in a DC scheme, the individual member (usually the employee) bears the risk. In other words, a member of a DB scheme is 'guaranteed' a certain pension benefit whereas, for a member of a DC scheme, the level of contributions, rather than the final benefit, is pre-defined. DB schemes are usually more complex than DC schemes. A DB scheme, which pre-defines the pension benefit, resembles an insurance product (that is, a life insurance). A DC scheme is similar to promises made by investment institutions, which do not usually give firm guarantees on investment returns. The difference between DB and DC schemes has implications for the supervision structure. Financial supervision of DC schemes can be less complex in structure as there is no need for buffers. After all, in pure DC schemes, no pension promises are made to members; the risk lies with the members/employees.
In the Netherlands, the first pillar is the state old-age pension (Dutch acronym: AOW). Every person with social insurance cover in the Netherlands accrues 2% of a full state pension per annum. A full state pension right is earned after fifty years (currently between the 10 For instance: women outlive men. Should they still be treated equally? 11 This includes raising the retirement age, potentially rewarding late retirement and discouraging early retirement. 12 To quote the European Commission: 'By demonstrating the interdependence of the various schemes and revealing weaknesses in some scheme designs the crisis has acted as a wake-up call for all pensions, whether PAYG or funded: higher unemployment, lower growth, higher national debt levels and financial market volatility have made it harder for all systems to deliver on pension promises', Green Paper. 13 It is unclear where those prerogatives begin and end exactly. As mentioned, EU policy affects practically every aspect of 'pension policy'. 14 A website was launched especially for this purpose: <ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId¼en&catId¼89&newsId¼839&furtherNews¼yes>. 15 Quoted from the Green Paper. 16 The potential impediments are plentiful and virtually impossible to grasp. As there is hardly any harmonization in many fields, we have had to select a number of areas. Schouten already discussed a number of obstacles relating to cross-border pension administration by insurance companies. In his opinion, the key reasons why pension insurers undertake hardly any cross-border activities are differences in applicable law, provisions of general interest, varying tax rules, and market-related differences. Due to ageing, the contributions are often not high enough to cover this expenditure and any shortfalls will have to be cleared using public funds. Given the fact that many governments face budget deficits, our argument that funded pension systems will become the standard in the future will come as no surprise. What is striking about the Explanatory Memorandum is that the among others 47 -the old provisions (the above-mentioned Articles 27 and 28) of the Solvency I directives were transposed in the new Solvency II framework as they were, meaning that IORPs with insurance activities effectively continue to be governed by the Solvency I framework.
However, the matter becomes even more complex as Article 4 of the IORP Directive offers an interesting option. It allows Member
States to choose to apply the provisions of Articles 9 to 16 and Articles 18 to 20 of the IORP Directive to the occupational retirement provision business of insurance undertakings. 48 In that case, all assets and liabilities corresponding to this business will be ring- Before addressing this issue in greater detail, we will first provide some background information about the Dutch pension system.
An Adequate and Sustainable Pension
We believe that a funded pension system is preferable to a PAYG system. In an ageing society, a funded system offers the assets that are needed to provide pensioners with an income. There is less pressure on general resources as pension benefits do not have to be funded from current contributions. This is all the more relevant in a society with an economically active population that contributes to gross domestic product (GDP) and pensioners who do not contribute or do so to a lesser extent because they are able to provide for their own income. Moreover, a funded pension system spreads income evenly over a beneficiary's life so that they can enjoy an income after their service period. A funded pension system does, however, exist by the grace of the so-called EET system, 60 a tax facility. Under this system, contributions to a pension scheme are tax-deductible (i.e., nontaxable or Exempt), the capital accrual of the pension benefit is also Exempt, and the effective benefits being liable to Tax. This is how a funded pension system that is based on the EET system also gener- other Member States should no longer be subject to tax discrimination. 67 This does not mean, however, that paying pension contributions to a foreign pension administrator is always an option. This is a possibility only if the pension scheme administrated by a foreign pension administrator meets all the tax criteria that the country providing the tax relief has imposed on the pension scheme; and that is rarely the case in practice. What follows is an example.
In the EU, Member States have considerable tax autonomy, 68 the result being that Member States are free to devise their own national tax regimes as long as they have regard to the equality principle. This had led to most EU Member States structuring their pension systems such that pension contributions paid into a foreign pension scheme do not qualify for tax relief unless that foreign pension scheme meets their national tax rules for pensions. 69 In practice, this proves hardly ever to be the case because national tax rules for pensions vary so strongly from Member State to Member State that these rules seldom correspond in two countries. There is no single pension scheme that meets the tax requirements in more than one country. In order to offer qualifying pension schemes in different countries, a pension administrator is forced, therefore, to offer domestic pension schemes in several countries. This is definitely a tall order. will grant relief only to the level that is customary in that country. In summary, we can conclude that foreign pension schemes of non-mobile workers are required to meet domestic tax rules, effectively cancelling out any tax relief. Mobile workers are also granted only limited cross-border tax relief in practice because host countries can always impose the requirement that pension schemes need to stay within the substantive limits of their domestic tax rules. They hardly ever do, especially from a Dutch perspective, so that tax relief for contributions to a Dutch pension scheme that is continued in a foreign country is a near impossibility. This impossibility, which is due to the principle of fiscal autonomy, forms an impediment to a European market for cross-border pension accrual. Our argument is that, based on the 'Safeguarding' Directive and the 'Posting' Regulation, the host country should always, in a posting situation, grant tax relief for the full contributions paid into a pension scheme originating in a worker's home country. Only then will a worker not experience barriers in accruing pension in posting situations. Contributions paid into foreign pension schemes by non-mobile workers should ideally also qualify for tax relief irrespective of whether the relief is broader than that offered under their own domestic regime.
This will long be a utopian thought, however; it would be a departure from the principle of fiscal autonomy.
There is a perhaps somewhat more realistic alternative. The EU could adopt a basic pension scheme that would qualify for tax relief in every EU Member State. This idea is also referred to as the '28th regime'. The European Financial Services Round Table (EFR) has proposed such a regime for top-up pension products in the third pillar. 79 Second-pillar pensions could be governed by a 28th regime as well, according to us. The goal remains, after all, to allow every EU citizen to create an adequate, tax-efficient retirement provision. It is irrelevant, in principle, whether the pension is accrued in the second or third pillar, or whether the citizen in question is employed, selfemployed, or a business owner. Another suggestion would be to devise a pension scheme that meets the domestic tax laws of several Member States. In order to achieve this, tax rules would have to be mapped out systematically on a country-by-country basis. Any corresponding elements should be incorporated into the scheme, disregarding elements that are at variance, for instance with regard to tax relief. Figure 2 illustrates the idea. The horizontal bars demonstrate the tax aspects of the pension systems in the countries in question.
Any overlaps between the countries are incorporated into the pension scheme (the vertical bar). The result is a pension scheme whose tax aspects are acceptable in several Member States.
The feasibility of such a pension scheme has already been explored for the Netherlands and Belgium. 80 The conclusion was that, under circumstances, a fully employer-funded collective DC scheme would qualify for tax relief in both Belgium and the Netherlands.
CONCLUSION
The cross-border activities of IORPs are slow in coming off the 82 Having regard to the sovereignty of the Member States.
